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Abstract
This paper investigates the effectiveness of foreign exchange in-
tervention of central banks of Canada and Switzerland. We ex-
amine the effectiveness of Canada and Switzerland intervention
policies on $ Canadian dollar against $ US dollar and Swiss franc
against $ US dollar exchange rates volatility over the 1980-2014 pe-
riod. A behavioural equation is estimated with instrumental vari-
ables methodology. The main results indicate that interventions
generally reduce exchange rates volatility. However, the Swiss Na-
tional Bank seems to be more efficient by stabilizing the Swiss franc
than the Bank of Canada, whose interventions, despite its effective-
ness, remains weak.
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Introduction
Volatility is one of the prevalent features of financial data including ex-
change rates. The impact of monetary policy on exchange rates has been
the subject of a large body of empirical research since the early 1990s.
Excessive exchange rate volatility is believed to interfere with the effi-
ciency of the foreign exchange market, the international flow of goods,
services, investment capital and the conduct of monetary policy (Rogers
and Siklos,2003).
Since official intervention data becoming publicly available, the empir-
ical literature on central bank foreign exchange intervention has been
growing rapidly. Official exchange rate intervention in the foreign ex-
change market occurs when the authorities buy or sell foreign exchange,
normally against their own currency in order to affect the exchange rate
(Taylor and Sarno, 2001). Many papers have explored the determinants
and efficacy of intervention (Edison, 1993; Sarno and Taylor 2000)
Under the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, interventions
were used frequently to maintain the exchange rate within prescribed
margins. The objective was to avoid the excessive volatility and prevent
competitive depreciation (Dominguez, 1998). After the breakdown of the
institution in 1973, interventions excessively increased.
In the current monetary system, many rich countries adopted laissez-faire
approach towards foreign-exchange markets.Then, the exchange rates
of major currencies such as the US dollar, Euro or the Yen fluctuate
with market forces. Other medium-sized industrialized open economies,
such as Canada, Australia and Switzerland, have also adopted a market-
determined floating rate regime (IMF, 2000). Central banks have the op-
tion to intervene and often do so in an attempt to correct imbalances in
the current account. It is, therefore of importance to understand the con-
sequences of central bank intervention (Beltratti et Morana, 2000;Kearns
and Rogobon, 2005).
In Neely’s survey (survey of Bank for International Settlement on Foreign
Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity),47 percent of the respon-
dents claimed that foreign exchange intervention is aimed at resisting
short-term trends, 22 percent suggested that its main goal is to elim-
inate misalignments from fundamental values, while the rest indicated
different and unspecified reasons for intervention (Nelly, 2000).
Is Foreign exchange intervention, especially in small open economies
such as Canada and Switzerland, effective? Why Canada and Switzer-
land? Historically, the Canadian and Swiss economies have similarities
and differences. First, these countries are small and open industrialized
economies. Their individual activities have no influence on the level of
global activity. Secondly, both countries’ currencies are viewed as being
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sensitive to similar factors such as interest rate and inflation differentials
vis-a-vis the US. Thirdly, they have an inflation target in their monetary
policies formulations. The Bank of Canada aims to keep inflation at 2
percent, and its commitment to inflation targeting was considered more
formal (Rogers and Siklos, 2003).However, the choice of these countries
doesn’t just rely on their similarities but also in their differences. Prior
to September 1998, Canada’s policy was to systematically intervene in
the foreign exchange market to automatically counter excessive pressure
on the Canadian dollar. This policy changed in September 1998. The
Swiss central bank is known to be one of the most interventionist central
banks in the world.
This paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions of central
banks of Canada and Switzerland. The rest of this paper is organized
as follows. First, we briefly summarize the extant literature. Section 2
describes data and econometric specifications, while Section 3 discusses
the results. Section 4 concludes.
1 Literature Review
We summarise the literature on why central banks intervene in for-
eign exchange markets, how they intervene, and how interventions can
work.
1.1 Why central banks intervene in foreign exchange mar-
kets?
According to Adler and Mora (2011), the real motives for intervention
can be grouped as: influence the level of the exchange rate, reduce the
volatility of the exchange rate or increase the official reserves for precau-
tion.
For Chutasripanich and Yetman (2015), the real motives of the monetary
authorities can be summarised into four main purposes:
- Leaning against the wind: the central banks used to intervene in
foreign exchange markets not only to limit exchange rate volatility but
also to smooth the trend path of the exchange rate.
- Reducing exchange rate misalignment: Central banks intervene
when the exchange rate is too high and can reduce a country’s compet-
itiveness or too low to lead to an unsustainable growth and inflation(
Chutasripanich and Yetman, 2005).
- Accumulating reserves: According to Adler and Mora (2011), 50
percent of interventions by central banks on the foreign exchange market
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between 2004-2010 were motivated at least by the desire to accumulate
reserves.
- Ensuring liquidity Central banks also intervene in the market ex-
change rates to ensure liquidity in the market and to avoid financial
stress.
1.2 How central banks intervene in foreign exchange mar-
kets
We first observe sterilized interventions and non-sterilized operations.Official
intervention is said to be sterilized when the authorities simultaneously
or with a very short lag take action to offset or “sterilize” the effects
of a change in official foreign asset holdings on the domestic monetary
base. On the other hand, non-sterilized intervention occurs when the
authorities buy or sell foreign exchange, normally against their own cur-
rency without such offsetting actions (Sarno and Taylor,2001).However,
The means by which central banks intervene in foreign exchange markets
vary across a number of dimensions. Intervention can be rule-based or
discretionary. According to Canales-Kriljenko (2003), central banks need
discretion to determine when to intervene. Discretion has the advantage
of allowing the central bank to adapt to market conditions and to plan
strategies. Some others theoretical studies support that “rule-based”
intervention can be more effective (Krugman,2001).
1.3 central banks intervention’s channels
We identify at least two channels through which central bank interven-
tion in the foreign exchange market can influence agents’ behavior: the
portfolio channel and the expectations channel.
Portfolio-balance channel: The portfolio-balance channel assumes
that economic agents are risk averse, and that foreign and domestic
bonds are imperfect substitutes for each other in an agent’s portfolio.
It operates when there is imperfect substitutability between domestic
and foreign assets and the risk premium increases with the supply of
domestic assets. That means that in closed financial markets the sub-
stitutability between domestic and foreign assets is likely to be low. If
the central bank, as a major market player, influences the supply or de-
mand of financial assets through its own trading activities, this is likely
to result in other market participants rebalancing their financial asset
portfolios (Sarno and Taylor, 2001)
Signalling or expectations channel: The second is expectations or
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signaling channel. This channel works through the adjustment of expec-
tations about future central bank policy. A highly-publicised transaction
in foreign exchange markets may be interpreted as setting a precedent
for future interventions, or revealing information about the level of the
exchange rate that is considered desirable by policymakers (Chutasri-
panich and Yetman,2015) This channel is effective if agents revise their
expectations of current or future policy and the resulting exchange rate
(Rogers ans Siklos,2003).
Morana and Beltratti (2000) focused on evaluating the effects of sterilized
central bank interventions on the FX market for the period 1992 to 1995
with high-frequency data. Their results revealed that the interventions
are not particularly effective. Dominguez (2003) examined the interven-
tion effects of the monetary authorities of United States, Germany and
Japan on the US dollar/ deutsch mark exchange rate and the volatil-
ity of the US dollar/yen exchange rate over the period 1977-1994. His
results suggested that interventions increase the volatility of exchange
rates.Rogers and Siklos (2003) found for Canada and Australia an in-
effectiveness of interventions. Both central banks are largely ineffective
and constitute an additional source of volatility in the foreign exchange
market. Fatum (2005) analyzed the effects of the Bank of Canada’s in-
tervention on the CAD/USD exchange rate for the period from January
1995 to September 1998. He concluded that the Bank of Canada has
failed to reduce the volatility of the exchange rate and the impact of its
sterilized interventions is very low on the volatility of the exchange rate.
Conversely, some studies pointed the effectiveness of sterilized interven-
tions. Ramaswamy and Samiei (2000) used daily data on the period
1995-1999 to estimate a simple prospective model of the exchange rate
and concluded that foreign exchange interventions have weak but persis-
tent effets on the yen-dollar exchange rate. Their results concluded that
co-ordinated interventions by agreement between central banks, have a
greater probability to reduce exchange rate volatility. Park (2008) exam-
ines the main features of daily foreign exchange intervention on the US
dollar against the Australian dollar for the period 1983-1997. He finds a
contemporary positive correlation between the direction of the interven-
tion, the average and the conditional variance of exchange rate returns.
His results suggests that large and sustainable interventions have a sta-
bilizing influence in the foreign exchange market. Without these inter-
ventions, the market would have been exposed to more volatility.
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2 Data and econometric approach
Some differences remain regarding to the econometric approach to in-
vestigate the effectiveness of central bank interventions on the foreign
exchange market. However, data about official interventions are very
scarce.
To address the problem of intervention data paucity, some proxy vari-
ables have been constructed. Neely (2001) defended the use of changes
in reserves exchange as a proxy for interventions by analyzing the corre-
lation between interventions and international reserves of central banks.
His paper concluded that changes in reserves are positively correlated
with central bank interventions. His results have recently been sup-
ported by Suardi and Chang (2012) who have found that variations in
international currency reserves of central banks are a good proxy for in-
terventions. Variations in international reserves were used by Taylor and
Sarno (2001) and Hodgson (2011).
We retain as variable for canadian and swiss interventions, the first dif-
ference in logarithm of international official reserves in US dollars as
specified by Hodgson (2011). Using a theoretical macroeconomic model
similar to the one of Taylor and Sarno (2001) and Adler and Mora (2011),
we do not explicitly test through which channel interventions work, but
simply if they affect the exchange rate variation. The central hypothesis
is that intervention affects the exchange rate.
However, the decision to intervene is not independent of the movements
in the exchange rate. Moreover, even after a central bank has decided
to intervene, the quantity of currency it buys or sells and its timing will
typically depend on the response of the exchange rate to its initial trades
(Kearns and Rigobon,2005).Some papers have attempted to solve the
problem of endogeneity by using high frequency data such as intraday
data. The motive for using such data is that if the data are sampled
at a higher frequency than the decision to intervene, then the contem-
porary relationship between interventions and the exchange rate would
not be endogenous, but doubts that high-frequency data estimates are
poorly informative about the persistent effects of interventions. Accord-
ing to Blanchard et al. (2015), low-frequency data such as quarterly data
would be more appropriate for studying the macroeconomic effects of in-
terventions we instrumentalize the intervention variable to mitigate the
endogeneity problem by using the lagged international reserves.
The sample period runs from January, 1980 to september, 2014 for
Canada and January, 2000 to september, 2014.
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The theoretical equation is expressed as:
∆Ei,t = ε+ θ
2∑
P=1
Ii,t−p + λXi,t + νi,t (1)
where ε, θ are parameters. Et is the natural log of the exchange rate
variation (domestic currency price in US dollar). ∆ is the first difference
operator and νt the error term.
It−p stands for the natural log of interventions of central bank measured
by lagged international official reserves in US dollar. X is a vector of
macro-economic variables. The vector includes: interest rate differential
(difference between domestic and US interest rates), inflation rate differ-
ential (difference between domestic inflation rate and the inflation rate of
the United States),the trade balance (difference between exports and im-
ports) of canadian and swiss economy, the growth rate of Canadian and
swiss economies, the returns of the S&P 500 and the S&P/TSX (Stan-
dard&Poor’s Toronto Stock Exchange) and Swiss Market Index. Returns
are the first log difference in percentage of price of the asset.
According to Suardi and Chang (2012), most of studies on reserves con-
sider that the demand for reserves is a negative cost function of official
reserves.We use the US short-term interest rate at the end of the quar-
ter (interest rate on 3-month treasury bills) and the canadian and swiss
short term interest rates.
According to Rogers and Siklos (2003), the dollar and the swiss franc are
sensitive to the variation gap between the american and canadian and
american and swiss inflation rate.
The model to be estimated is:
∆ei,t = γ1 + γ2Ii,t−1 + γ3Ii,t−2 + γ4(st − s∗t ) + γ5(ut − u∗t ) + γ6yi,t
+γ7Xi,t + γ8Zt + γ9Ti,t + νi,t (2)
ei,t denotes the log of the nominal exchange rate (against the US dollar)
for country i at time t . We introduce the variable in first and second dif-
ferences for ensuring that is stationary.The volatility is measured by the
first quadratic difference in exchange rate returns (Dominguez, 1998).
Ii,t−p is the lagged official intervention of central bank also used us in-
struments to address the endogeneity issue when (st−s∗t ) is the difference
between domestic (domestic policy interest rate) and US interest rates
(interest rate on 3-month treasury bills).
(ut − u∗t ) is the difference between domestic inflation rate and US infla-
tion rate.
yi,t is the domestic economic growth rate.
Xi,t is the domestic assets returns. To capture the impact of domestic
and foreign financial markets on the Switzerland franc and the Canadian
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dollar, we use the returns of the Swiss Market Index (SMI), S&P/TSX
(Standard&Poor’s /Toronto Stock Exchange) returns.
Zt is the returns of the S&P 500. Returns are built as the first difference
as percentage of the log of asset prices.
Ti,t is the domestic trade balance. Canada and Switzerland are major
producers of raw materials. The demand for these products and their
prices on world markets are also determinants of the value of the Cana-
dian dollar and Switzerland franc. Canada and Switzerland are highly
dependent on their exchange rate vis-a`-vis the american dollar. The
United States remains the second largest bilateral trading partner of
Switzerland and the first bilateral trading partner of Canada . We intro-
duce the trade balance of Canada and Switzerland to capture the impact
of international trade on the exchange rate of each country. νi,t is the
error term.
3 Results and discussion
Table 1 presents the results for instrumental variables regression analysis
estimating the effectiveness of interventions on exchange rate volatility.
The Sargan-Hansen overidentification test concludes on the validity of
the instruments. (P-val=0.843). The results show that over the sample
period, (first quarter of 1980 to the third quarter of 2014) the Bank of
Canada’s interventions were effective by changing the path of the ex-
change rate and reducing the volatility of the $ canadian. There is a
negative relationship between interventions of Bank of Canada and the
volatility of Canadian dollar exchange rate against the US dollar . The
negative sign associated to the interventions coefficient means the Bank
of Canada is acting on the exchange rate in the direction desired. An in-
crease (decrease) in international official reserves induces a depreciation
(appreciation) of the exchange rate. An increase of one percentage point
of international official reserves is significantly associated with 0.019%
exchange rate depreciation. Monetary interventions are therefore essen-
tially stabilizing the volatility of the exchange rate of the Canadian dollar
against the US dollar. Thus, in order to reverse a pronounced upward
trend in the rate of its currency or to slow down the rate of appreciation
of its currency, the Bank of Canada is selling on the foreign exchange
market its own currency from its own cash in exchange for american dol-
lar. That result confirms the the conclusions of Adler and Tovar (2011)
and Daude et al (2014).
Furthermore,The results reveal a positive and significant relationship be-
tween the interest rate differential between Canada and United States
and the volatility of the exchange rate. A 1% increase in the differ-
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ence between Canadian and US interest rates induces an increase in the
volatility of the exchange rate of 0.005%.
The coefficient of inflation rate differential remains very marginal and
weak on the volatility of exchange rate. This is partly explained by the
fact that in the beginning of 1980s, the inflation rate in United States
experienced a downward trend because of the restrictive monetary policy
and the control of inflation. Over the same period, the level of inflation
has significantly decreased in Canada especially from 1984 to the decade
1990-2000. The variability of the inflation differential has been low be-
tween Canada and the United States over the 1980s and 1990s.
A surplus of the trade balance induces a variability in the order of
0.0045% of the exchange rate between Canadian and US currencies. Both
american and canadian financial markets affect the canadian dollar dif-
ferently. While the S&P 500 appears to be positively and significantly
correlated with the volatility of canadian dollar, the S&P/TSX affects
negatively the exchange rate. Investors’ portfolios in the US financial
market affect the volatility of the Canadian dollar. In fact, changes in
interest rates applied to assets by affecting the costs and returns of differ-
ent financial assets generally lead to speed movements in financial stocks
as investors rebalance most of their portfolios. In doing so, the finan-
cial markets re-adjust very quickly and the exchange rate over-reacts
strongly so that the financial markets can recover their balance. This
creates exchange rate volatility. S&P/TSX negatively and significantly
impacts the volatility of the Canadian dollar by reducing about 0.20% of
the volatility of Canadian dollar against the US dollar.
equation (1) reports the estimation over the entire sample period. equa-
tion (2) and (3) report the Chow test results for 1980Q1-1998Q3 and
1998Q4-2014Q3.
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Table 1: Estimation of canadian behavioural exchange rate
equation
variables equation (1) equation (2) equation (3)
official reserves -0.0197* -0.0151** 0.0161
(0.0078) (0.0045) (0.0218)
inflation rate 0.0036 0.0041 -0.0022
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
growth rate 0.00451 0.00227 0.00667
(0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0053)
S&P 500 0.247* 0.0164 0.720**
(0.123) (0.0898) (0.279)
interest rate 0.0056* 0.0069** -0.0047
(0.0028) (0.0015) (0.011)
trade balance 0.0045** 0.0011 0.0096**
(0.0013) (0.00083) (0.0018)
S&P TSX -0.201** -0.0919* -0.320**
(0.0619) (0.0359) (0.0706)
constante -0.0869 -0.0157 -1.521*
(0.145) (0.0960) (0.683)
Sargan and Hansen Test 0.813 0.128 0.1011
statistic F instruments F =169,2 -F =133,4 F =238,6
R2 0.413 0.467 0.574
The results of the estimation of the behavioral equation by instrumen-
tal variables reveal that the interventions of the Swiss National Bank
are effective. One percentage point increase in international reserves is
significantly associated with 0.33% of reduction for the volatility of the
Swiss franc. We conclude that the interventions of the National Bank
Switzerland stabilize exchange rate volatility of Swiss franc against the
US dollar. In addition, the associated coefficient for interventions in the
foreign exchange market is significantly stronger (0.33%) than canadian
interventions (0.019%).
The health of the Swiss economy has greatly affected the Swiss franc.
Growth rate is negatively and significantly associated to the volatility of
the Swiss franc. The good health of the Swiss economy in recent years
has protected the Swiss franc from high volatility. When we consider the
exchange rate between the Swiss franc and the US dollar, we are led to
question the impact of Swiss health on its exchange rate. A 1% increase
in the growth rate reduces volatility by 0.21% against the dollar Amer-
ican. However, if strong growth in Switzerland is followed by vigorous
growth in United States, the effect on the demand for Swiss francs will
be weak.
Table 2: Estimation of swiss behavioural exchange rate
equation
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variables equation (1) equation (2)
official reserves -0.330** -0.328**
(0.0301) (0.0327)
inflation rate -0.0623 -0.0676
(0.0680) (0.0691)
growth rate -0.218** -0.214**
(0.0524) (0.0532)
S&P 500 -0.0327** -0.0317**
(0.00952) (0.00998)
interest rate -0.0781 -0.0744
(0.0637) (0.0663)
trade balance -0.0208*** -0.0193
(0.0122) (0.0128)
SMI -0.0257*** -0.0257***
(0.0138) (0.0138)
constante 0.0323 -0.0126
(0.145) (0.0960)
Sargan and Hansen Test 0.4797 0.5255
statistic F instruments F =205.7** F =184.3**
R2 0.794 0.795
Furthermore, US and Swiss financial markets significantly affect the price
of the Swiss franc against the US dollar. S&P 500 returns negatively and
significantly reduces 0.032% volatility of the Swiss franc.
4 Conclusion
This paper is particularly interested in the effectiveness of Canadian and
Swiss central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market. The
recent excessive movements in the exchange rate of several economies
relative to the US dollar have seen most monetary authorities intervene
in the foreign exchange market to support their currencies.
The choice of Canada and Switzerland is based on a number of rea-
sons: the Canadian and Swiss economies have similarities and diver-
gences. They are small open industrialized economies. Moreover, these
two economies have an inflation target in monetary policy formulation
and their currencies are considered to be quite sensitive to factors such
as the interest rate and inflation differentials vis-a`-vis the United States.
Finally, as divergences, Canada’s policy is to intervene on the foreign ex-
change market in a discretionary rather than a systematic way, and only
in exceptional circumstances when the Swiss National Bank is reputed
to be one of the most interventionist central banks in the world. The
interventions of the two central banks were effective and stabilizing the
exchange rate of the two economies vis-a`-vis the US dollar. Although
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the economic literature presented in this study mentioned the various
intervention channels, our study focused mainly on assessing the effec-
tiveness of the interventions of the two central banks on their respective
currencies. Subsequent works may involve explicitly testing which chan-
nel seems more effective in impacting exchange rate volatility through
interventions.
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